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Abstract 
An important issue in the use of expert sys­
tems is the so-called brittleness problem. Ex­
pert systems model only a limited part of 
the world. While the explicit management of 
uncertainty in expert systems mitigates the 
brittleness problem, it is still possible for a 
system to be used, unwittingly, in ways that 
the system is not prepared to address. Such 
a situation may be detected by the method 
of straw models, first presented by Jensen et 
al. [1990] and later generalized and justified 
by Laskey [1991]. We describe an algorithm, 
which we have implemented, that takes as 
input an annotated diagnostic Bayesian net­
work (the base model) and constructs, with­
out assistance, a bipartite network to be used 
as a straw model. We show that in some 
cases this straw model is better that the in­
dependent straw model of Jensen et al., the 
only other straw model for which a construc­
tion algorithm has been designed and imple­
mented. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Developing a diagnostic expert system that uses a 
Bayesian network as a model of the domain of interest 
requires several activities, such as knowledge acquisi­
tion, learning, sensitivity analysis, and conflict check­
ing [Andreassen et al., 1987; Andersen et al., 1989; 
Spiegelhalter et al., 1993]. By conflict we mean that 
the model is no longer valid for the given data [Jensen 
et. al., 1990; Laskey, 1991]1. In other words, for a 
given piece of data, we cannot have any confidence in 
the results coming from the system. Note that this 
is possible even though Bayesian networks cannot be 
inherently inconsistent, in the sense that, if their (lo­
cal) conditional probability tables are consistent, they 
1 The definition of conflict in this paper is not that used 
in the model-based diagnosis literature, where a conflict is 
defined as a set of components at least one of which must 
be faulty. 
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always encode a probability distribution [Pearl, 1988, 
Chapter 3; Neapolitan, 1990, Theorem 5.2]. 
In practice, what can happen is that, while using a 
Bayesian network in a diagnostic application, we ob­
serve that the evidence on which the diagnosis should 
be based is very unlikely given the network. It may be 
that the evidence at hand describes a rare case that 
the network is fully qualified to handle, but it may 
also be that the network is not equipped to handle the 
case, and that the low probability of the case is an 
indication of that. We maintain that it is important 
for Bayesian network to distinguish between the two 
situations just described. 
Consider, as a simple example, the use of a system 
designed to classify geological resources. This system, 
when presented with data from, say, the moon, would 
show the data to be very unlikely. A (naive) use of 
the system would wonder whether this low probability 
derives from the presence of an unusual sample that 
the system is built to handle, or whether the system is 
simply not built to handle the sample. In the example, 
the latter situation holds. By definition, a geological 
resource is a resource of the earth, but our hypothetical 
user's command of the English (or Greek) language is 
weak enough. It may be disastrous or very expensive 
to treat the sample as correctly classified. It would be 
very desirable for the system to indicate to the user 
the existence of a conflict. 
The world we live in is filled with countless factors. 
If we restrict our interest to the medical world, some 
factors might be age, gender, stress, and so on. If we 
have a disease, we try to find out why it happened and 
how to cure it. In other words, the main concern in 
this world is to find out relationships among factors. 
Hence, we need a world that has a probability distri­
bution that represents the relationships among factors. 
We call this world a model. 
Because the world is big and complex, models of the 
world are difficult to design and represent. We use 
instead a small world in which we ignore some fac­
tors and some relationship, assumed to be small and 
unimportant. Every world we can express and use is 
to be considered a small world. Moreover, the models 
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we can manage are always approximated models for a 
small world, obtained by making some background as­
sumptions. In certain conditions, called conflict data, 
that violate the background assumptions, the model 
may be weak. If the model is presented with conflict 
data, the results obtained from it are unreliable. 
When we observe that the probability of some data 
is very low in a model, it is very difficult to decide 
whether the low probability comes from a rare situa­
tion covered in the model or from data conflict. The 
best way to solve this problem is to compare the result 
with the full world model [Laskey and Lehner, 1992; 
1994]. Since it is impossible to construct this kind of 
model, we fall back on the next best option, which is 
to construct a better model and compare results. But 
the reason for checking conflict is not only to diagnose 
the model itself, but also to trigger revision for a better 
model. In other words, we cannot assume the availabil­
ity of a better model; if we had it, we would use it in­
stead of the model for which a conflict is suspected. To 
overcome this quandary, Laskey [1991] suggests straw 
models that "capture some of the expert's intuitions 
about how the model could go wrong, but are com­
putationally much simpler than the fully specified al­
ternate model." In particular, a straw model may be 
an approximated model of a given model. The straw 
model is structurally poor and less probable than the 
given model because of the absence of details (factors 
and relationships) that may be very relevant. How­
ever, the absence of these factors and relationships can 
make the straw model more probable when some con­
flict is caused by them. 
By comparing a given model with a straw model, a 
conflict can be detected easily and automatically with­
out construction of a better model that requires more 
effort. More concretely, suppose that we obtain a low 
probability of some findings (evidence) that we suspect 
to be too low to be happening in a real-life situation. 
Further suppose that the probability of the findings 
in the straw model is higher than the probability of 
the findings in the given model. Then, we can con­
clude very reliably that the evidence is a conflict for 
the given model, and we should alert the user of this. 
Laskey [1991] quantifies these issues as follows. (Also 
see Laskey [1994] and Laskey and Lehner [1992;1994] 
for related material.) A world is a vector of propo­
sitional variables and a model can be represented by 
assigning a probability distribution over the variables 
in the world. Assume that a small world X is embed­
ded within a larger world W = (X', lJ. \Ve use the 
following notation. 
X: A vector of propositional variables that represents 
a small world: Each variable X; can take on values 
in a set x;1, . . .  , Xik· 
X': A vector with the same variables as X, but which 
has additional outcomes in the larger world that 
are not represented in the small world. 
Y: A vector of variables that are not explicitly rep­
resented in the small world. 
!.: Variables to which a value is assigned (data or 
evidence variables). 
pa(-): Probability distribution encoded in the model 
(usually, assessed by the expert). 
P0(-): Probability distribution of alternate (straw) 
model. 
P(·): Probability distribution on the larger world that 
pa intends to approximate. 
Using the notation defined above, the global probabil­
ity distribution P( ·) is what we want to approximate 
with the distribution pa(-). The following statements 
and theorem explain the relation between these two 
probability distributions and how a straw model (with 
its distribution P0(-)) can be used to detect conflict. 
Let the proposition q represent the background as­
sumptions for pa(-): 
q = ((\ x; E {x;1, . . .  , x;k}) !\ CV Y = JLi) 
i !L.j 
For any !. in the small world X, we have: 
pa(-) = P(!.l q) = L P(!., JL I q) 
!!:. 
When the model pa(-) is not appropriate, we have: 
P0(-) = P(!.l•q) = L P(!., JL I •q) 
!!:. 
Let P(q) = 1 - c. The model P(-), restricted to the 
variables X', can be written: 
Theorem 1 (Surprise Index) [Laskey, 1991]. Let 
pa(-) and P'(·) be probability distributions over X. 
Define the index of surprise at evidence Xe under pa(-) 
relative to ps (-) as: -
Let 'Irk be the probability under pa that c8 is greater 
than I\. Then 'Irk = 2-K. 
When pa ( ·) applies, P8 should be much more probable 
than pa to produce high values of the surprise index. 
Equivalently, "high values of conflict are a priori un­
likely when the assessed model is considered probable. 
In other words, any alternate model specified a priori 
is unlikely to fit the data much better than the as­
sessed model" [Laskey, 1991, p. 201]. It is therefore 
reasonable to inform the user that a conflict is possible 
when the surprise index has a high value. 
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Figure 1: Given model and bipartite straw model. 
2 THE BIP ARTITE STRAW 
MODEL 
A bipartite straw model can be obtained by the elim­
ination of some factors (variables) from the given 
model2. Elimination of variables is a classic kind of 
abstraction. (See, e.g., [Mozetic, 1991].) Clearly, the 
quality of the straw model depends critically on which 
variables are eliminated, a choice that depends on the 
domain and on the task addressed by the expert sys­
tem. Since we are interested in diagnosis, we consider 
the task of heuristic classification and divide variables 
into three groups. One is called Target and consists 
of the variables for which we want to know the prob­
abilities. The next group is Evidence, and the find­
ings belong to this group. The last group is called 
Other, and it includes variables that do not belong to 
the above two groups. In medical diagnosis the tar­
get variables might be diseases, the evidence variables 
may by symptoms, and the variables in Other may be 
factors such as age or weight3. (See Figure 1 for an 
illustration.) 
Since we construct the bipartite straw model by elimi­
nating the Other variables, the straw model consists of 
the target and evidence variables only. More precisely 
and formally, letting pa(A) be the parents of node A, 
we have: 
U = Target U Evidence U Other 
2We could have called this straw model naive Bayes or 
idiot Bayes model, but we chose a more neutral name for 
it. 
3While our implementation of the algorithm for con­
struction of the bipartite straw model does not assume any 
relative ordering of the three groups of variables, in the di­
agnostic applications we have in mind the target variables 
precede the evidence variables, and the Other variables ei­
ther are setting factors that precede the target variables, or 
are physiological states that are placed between the target 
variables and the evidence variables. 
GiveaModel 
Figure 2: The diagnosis system for liver and breast 
cancer. 
u•traw = Target U Evidence 
pa(A) =Target 'VA E Evidence 
Then, for each A E Evidence and for each Target, the 
vector of Target variables, we have: 
p•traw(A I Target) = L pgiven(A I finding= Target) 
\A 
We can therefore obtain the entries in the table of 
conditional probabilities for each evidence variable by 
belief propagation. Similarly, for all A E Target, the 
prior probabilities for the straw model are related to 
probabilities in the given model as follows: 
p•traw(A) = L pgiven(A I finding={}) 
\A 
The details of the algorithm used to compute p•traw 
are beyond the scope of this paper and can be found 
in [Kim, 1994]. 
In our bipartite straw model, all target variables are 
parents of each evidence variable, and the target vari­
ables are conditionally independent of each other ( cf. 
Figure 1). The variable elimination method makes 
the straw model weak and structurally poor when the 
Other variables give a high value of probabilistic cau­
sation, such as, for example, in the case of old age and 
neuralgia. But when conflict data is entered, and the 
conflict is caused by variables in Other, the bipartite 
straw model is more probable than the given model. 
3 EX AMPLE OF CONSTRUCTION 
AND USE OF THE BIP ARTITE 
STR AW MODEL 
Assume a (fictitious) medical diagnosis system for liver 
and breast cancer represented by the Bayesian network 
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Age (B) 
bcl.ow30 aboYe30 
Gender (A) = male (0, 100) (I, 99) 
Gene!« (A) = female (20, 80) (50, 50) 
Jomt probability table foc 
. Breast Cancer given Gendrr and Age 
Breast Cancer (D) 
yes no 
Livrr Cancer (E) = yes (95, 5) (Ill, ll) 
UverCancer(E) • no (80, 20) (5, 95) 
Joint probability table foc 
X -ray given Breast and Livrr Cancer 
Age (B) 
bdow30 above30 
Aloohol (B) = ya (IO,'Xl) (40,00) 
Alcohol (B) =no (�98) (IO,'Xl) 
Joint JIObability 1able for 
Liver Cancer given Alcohol and Age 
Bra��� I Cancer (D) 
Liver Cmcer (E) 
}a no 
Diiletes (H) (95,5) (5, 95) .. 
" ConditiOnal probability table for 
Diabetes given Livrr Cancer 
Gender(A) 
male female 
Aloohoi(B) (95,5) (IO,'Xl) 
. . .. ConditiOnal prol.hilily table foc 
Alcohol given Gendrr 
Figure 3: Probability tables for a fictitious diagnostic 
system. 
of Figure 2 with conditional probability tables given in 
Figure 3. 
The given model is such that palpation is associated 
with females and diabetes is associated with males. 
The findings (Palpation = yes, Diabetes= no) conflict 
with the assumptions used when building he model. 
This is well detected by a positive conflict index. Our 
program gives the following results: 
pgiven(Palpation =yes, Diabetes =yes) = 0.0452 
pstraw(Palpation =yes, Diabetes =yes) = 0.0619 
Therefore the conflict index c, = log(P•traw j pgiven) 
is positive and the user is alerted of a conflict. 
4 COMPARISON OF THE 
INDEP END ENT AND 
BIP ARTIT E STR AW MODELS 
Finn Jensen et al. [1990] propose a straw model in 
which all variables are independent of each other and 
have implemented this straw model to compute the 
conflict index in HUG IN. Figure 4 illustrates the in­
dependent straw model. Jensen and his collabora­
tors assume that, in the absence of conflict, the joint 
probability of all evidence variables is greater that the 
product of probabilities of each evidence variable when 
the given model is applied, i.e., P(x, y) > P(x)P(y). 
They argue that this is normally the case, because 
P(xly) > P(x) and P(x, y) = P(xly)P(y). For the 
independent straw model, the conflict measure is de­
fined as: 
conf(x, ... , y) = log[(P(x) x . . .  x P(y))j P(x, ... , y)], 
where x, ... , y are the findings. 
The independent straw model is computationally sim­
pler than the bipartite straw model, but it may fail to 
detect conflict when the above assumption is violated, 
as shown in the following example, which continues 
the example of the previous section. 
If we obtain findings (Palpation = yes, X-ray = yes, 
Diabetes = yes) in the model of Figure 2, the relevant 
probabilities are: 
pgiven(Palpation =yes)= 0.252 
pgiven(X- ray= yes) = 0.365 
pgiven(Diabetes =yes)= 0.247 
pstraw (Palpation = yes, X - ray = yes, 
Diabetes = yes) = 0.252 x 0.365 x 0.247 = 0.0227 
pgive"(Palpation = yes, X- ray= yes, 
Diabetes = yes) = 0.0388 
Hence, the conflict index c, is 
c, = log(0.0227/0.0388) 
which is negative and indicates absence of conflict. 
On the other hand, since using the bipartite 
straw model pstraw(Palpation = yes, X - ray = 
yes, Diabetes = yes) = 0.0551, the conflict index us­
ing the bipartite straw model is 
c, = log(0.0551/0.0388) 
which is positive and indicates presence of conflict. 
We emphasize that a positive conflict index does not 
necessarily indicate that the given model is bad; it only 
alerts the user that assumptions taken in constructing 
the given model may not be appropriate for the data at 
hand. In the example, the given model was built with 
the background assumption that diabetes is associated 
with males and palpation is associated with females. 
This assumption is not satisfied in the case at hand. 
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Figure 4: Independent straw model. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown that the proposed bipartite straw 
model can be constructed automatically by eliminating 
the variables in Other, as described in the Section enti­
tled "The Bipartite Straw Model." This construction 
requires several procedures, which we implemented in 
the C language under the ULTRIX operating system. 
The two main algorithms used for the computation of 
the probabilities needed to obtain the conflict index 
are Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter's algorithm [1988], as 
described in [Neapolitan, 1990] and the algorithm by 
F.V. Jensen, described in [Jensen, 1990] The details 
of the system we have implemented are given in [Kim, 
1994]. 
The main contributions of our research may be sum­
marized as follows: 
1. We have demonstrated that it is possible to con­
struct straw models different and sometimes bet­
ter than the ones that have been presented so far 
in the literature (independent-type straw models) 
2. These new models (which we call bipartite straw 
models) can be constructed by abJtraction from 
diagnostic Bayesian networks (heuristic classifi­
cation models) with minimal intervention from 
knowledge engineers or experts, who only need 
to identify the target and evidence nodes in their 
models. 
3. To substantiate the claims, we wrote a program 
and tested it over several examples. 
Here is a list of suggestions for further research. 
1. The bipartite straw model is only one of vari­
ous possible ones. There may be other methods 
for designing straw models through various other 
elimination methods or the use of other (auto­
matic or semi-automatic) approximations and ab­
stractions, such as, e.g.: 
• Eliminate variables for which one value is 
much more probable than the others. 
• Eliminate certain states in variables [Well­
man, 1994]. 
• Combine certain variables into one. 
2. This approach should be tested on more realistic 
models. 
3. Conditions under which bipartite straw models 
are better than independent straw models should 
be investigated. We expect he bipartite straw 
model to be more accurate than the independent 
straw model, since it is structurally more complex. 
This, however, is not necessarily true in all situ­
ations, because the bipartite straw model drops 
the Other variables, such as Age in the example 
of Figure 2. 
4. The conflict (surprise) index should be character­
ized as a measure, if possible. 
5. The complexity of computing the conditional 
probability tables for the straw models needs to be 
analyzed. In particular, conditions under which 
the computation of the new tables can be done in 
polynomial time need to be investigated. 
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